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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
KEVIN GURR, 
De fendant/Appe11ant. 
Case No. 940657-CA 
Priority No. 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON. 
A. The Definition of the Crime. 
There is no dispute in this case as to the statutory 
definition of Count III of the Information in this case charging 
the Defendant with possessing a dangerous weapon while a 
restricted person. Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as 
Amended), provides that "any person who has been convicted of any 
crime of violence . . . may not own or have in his possession or 
under his control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part." 
The meaning of the terms "custody and control" and 
"possession" as used in Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (1989 as 
Amended), is not established by statute. However, case law has 
provided the definition to be used by the courts in interpreting 
the statute. In State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court approved the following jury instruction: 
"possession, custody or control" of a firearm 
is more than the innocent handling of the weapon. 
It requires a willing and knowing possession with 
intent to control its use or management. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Banks, 720 P. 2d 1380 
(Utah 1986) provided further guidance in stating: 
If the evidence showed that Banks "exercised 
dominion and control" over the weapon, "with 
knowledge of its presence," we would have no 
difficulty holding that Banks could be convicted, 
even though he may have shared control of the weapon 
with his wife and the third party . . . . 
Id. 
The cased cited above clearly establish that in order to 
convict the Defendant, there must be proof of two essential 
elements as it relates to the Defendant's "possession, custody 
and control." The State must prove that the Defendant both 
"exercised dominion and control over the weapon and had 
knowledge of its presence." 
The Appellee acknowledges that the statute and supporting 
case law establish the standard of proof set out above (See 
Appellee's brief at 6). 
B. Test on Appeal. 
The previous decisions of the Utah Appellate Courts are 
clear as to the test to be employed by this Court in reviewing a 
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. As stated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Strain, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), the Defendant must marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the jury verdict and then demonstrate how 
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this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is 
insufficient to support the verdict. 
The Court will reverse a decision on the basis of 
insufficiency of the evidence "only when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the Defendant 
committed the crime." Id. See also, State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 
540, 543 (Utah 1994); State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08 
(Utah App. 1984); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Purdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Appellee's conclusion that the Appellant has not 
marshalled the evidence is clearly erroneous (Appellee's brief 
at 7). The Appellant set out a comprehensive statement of the 
facts outlining the testimony at trial (Appellant's brief at 8-
13). In addition, the Appellant recited all of the evidence 
established in favor of the verdict in its argument (Appellant's 
brief at 16-20). 
C. Summary of the Evidence in This Case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in this case 
does not establish that Mr. Gurr exercised dominion and control 
over the weapons. 
i. The 12 Gauge Mossberg Shotgun. 
The testimony regarding the 12 gauge Mossberg shotgun is 
not in dispute. The State elicited only limited testimony from 
the investigating officers. Officer Blackhurst testified that he 
recovered two firearms consisting of a rifle and shotgun in a 
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"built-in kind of closet" (T. 145-146). 
It was the Defendant who called Tom King, the owner of the 
business and camp trailer where the Defendant was arrested. Mr. 
King testified that the 12 gauge Mossberg shotgun belonged to 
him and had never been used by the Defendant. Mr. King verified 
that he kept the shotgun in the trailer for his own purposes (T. 
190, 206-07). 
In the Appellee's brief there is no citation to the record 
revealing that anyone ever saw the Defendant, Mr. Gurr, in 
possession of the 12 gauge Mossberg shotgun (Appellee's brief at 
7-9). The only evidence cited by the Appellee that relates to 
the shotgun is that the Defendant had stayed in the trailer where 
the shotgun was located (Appellee's brief at 7-9). 
There is simply no evidence to establish that Mr. Gurr ever 
exercised dominion or control over the shotgun belonging to Mr. 
King during the time that he stayed in the camp trailer. There 
is no question that the camp trailer was used by a large number 
of people and in fact was owned by Mr. King. One of the personal 
items kept by Mr. King in his camp trailer was his shotgun. The 
Record establishes that the business had been the subject of 
theft and vandalism. It was because of theft and vandalism that 
Mr. King had asked the Defendant to stay in the camp trailer (T. 
177-78). There is nothing unusual about Mr. King's retention of 
a firearm in the camp trailer which adjoined his business, T & T 
Mechanical (T. 177-78). 
The evidence as it relates to dominion and control over the 
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Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun clearly fails. There is simply no 
evidence supporting the test outlined by the statute and case 
law. 
ii. Springfield .22 Caliber Rifle. 
Again, the only evidence offered by the State regarding the 
rifle was that of Officer Blackhurst that he found the rifle, 
along with the shotgun in the built-in closet (T. 145-46). The 
State offered no testimony that the Defendant had knowledge of 
the presence of the firearms or ever exercised dominion and 
control over the rifle. 
The Defendant produced testimony that the subject camp 
trailer was a small unit measuring approximately 10 feet wide by 
12 feet in length. The Defendant testified that he had lived in 
the small camp trailer for approximately two years prior to 
moving in with his girlfriend on October 1, 1993 (T. 176-78). 
The search in this case was conducted on October 20, 1993 (R. 30-
31). The Defendant's occupancy of the trailer in question was 
not exclusive. The trailer was used by Steven Page, Mr. Tom 
King's foster son, who was living in the larger mobile home 
located in close proximity to the small camp trailer. The 
significance of Mr. Page's use was established by testimony. The 
larger mobile home did not have water, power or telephone 
service. Steven Page was allowed access to the small camp 
trailer in order to allow him the ability to shower, use the 
bathroom, make telephone calls and reside in the unit at night 
that had lights (T. 178-79). It is respectfully submitted that a 
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person who uses the camp trailer for bathroom, power and 
telephone access as well as night-time use, certainly would have 
personal items located therein. 
In addition to Steven Page, the small camp trailer was used 
by Myron Johnson as well as Steven Page to watch T.V. (T. 179, 
202-03). Finally, the trailer was used by workers at Mr. King's 
mechanical shop during the day for coffee breaks and other 
miscellaneous uses. Mr. King used the trailer to do his book 
work (T. 179-80, 202-04). 
The Appellee's conclusion that only the Defendant lived in 
the trailer and had his personal belongings located therein is a 
total misstatement of the evidence (Appellee's brief at 8). As 
recited above, Mr. Tom King used the trailer consistently to do 
his book work and used the trailer to store firearms. 
Additionally, both Steven Page and Myron Johnson used the trailer 
in order to have bathroom and telephone access and to watch T.V. 
and have a power source at night. 
It is true that the Defendant testified that the rifle 
belonged to his father. The State argues that the Defendant's 
father did not have independent access to the small camp trailer 
(Appellee's brief at 9). However, there was no testimony 
regarding the transportation of the rifle to the camp trailer or 
the person or persons who used the rifle, if any. As summarized 
on pages 8 and 9 of the State's brief the sole evidence that 
supports the State's position is: 1) the Defendant was one of 
several occupants of the camp trailer; 2) the Defendant 
6 
acknowledged that the rifle belonged to his father; and 3) the 
Defendant's father did not have access to the trailer. 
What is obviously missing from the State's case is the 
following. First, there was no testimony that the rifle was 
purchased or owned by the Defendant, Kevin Gurr. Second, there 
was no testimony that the rifle was placed in Mr. King's camp 
trailer by the Defendant as opposed to the Defendant's father or 
the friends and relatives of the Defendant. Third, there is not 
one scintilla of evidence that the Defendant ever held the rifle 
in question or used the same. Fourth, that during the time the 
Defendant was moving in with his girlfriend in Springville, that 
he considered the rifle a possession of his and provided for its 
transportation to his new residence or provided for its security. 
D. The Law as Applied to the Facts of This Case. 
The State's case as it relates to the rifle is based on 
innuendo. The State argues that because the Defendant resided in 
the small camp trailer and that the rifle belonged to his father, 
there is a "link" between the Defendant and the rifle. In other 
words, the State contends that acknowledgement by a Defendant 
that a firearm is located at his residence, without more, is 
sufficient to sustain a finding that the Defendant controlled the 
weapon (Appellee's brief at 7-9). 
The case law establishes that the evidence is insufficient 
as a matter of law. The jury instruction approved in State v. 
Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1985), is dispositive: 
"Possession, custody or control" of a firearm is 
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more than the innocent handling of the weapon. It 
requires a willing and knowing possession with intent 
to control its use or management." 
The instruction recited above explicitly contemplates that a 
restricted person might handle innocently, a firearm. The 
instruction recites that the statute requires more than innocent 
handling. There must be proof that the Defendant possessed the 
firearm with intent to control its use or management. In this 
case, aside from the proof that the rifle was in a small camp 
trailer occupied non-exclusively by the Defendant, there is 
absolutely no evidence that the Defendant ever held the rifle or 
exerted control over its use or management. 
Instead, the testimony is that the rifle was located in a 
closet where Mr. King stored his shotgun. There was no testimony 
that the Defendant ever held or used the rifle. Additionally, 
there is no evidence that the Defendant ever dictated who could 
use the gun or the persons who would have access to it. There is 
no evidence of one single element that could be interpreted as 
control, use or management. 
The State's case rests entirely on the premise that the 
Defendant's non-exclusive occupancy of a residence where a gun is 
located is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt. There are 
a large number of scenarios that are analogous to the present 
case. If a roommate vacates an apartment, leaving a firearm that 
was used by him, is the remaining tenant (a restricted person), 
guilty under the statute?. If a husband and wife separate and 
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one of the parties is left with a firearm at the family home, is 
the restricted person remaining in the home guilty of unlawful 
conduct?. 
It is respectfully submitted that the issue was resolved in 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986). The execution of a 
no-knock warrant revealed Banks (an admittedly "restricted 
person" as defined by statute), his wife and a third party as 
residents of the house. During the subsequent search, the 
officers saw a shotgun leaning against a dresser in a bedroom. A 
further search of the residence revealed three other guns: two 
were found under the pillow on a bed and a third was in a bedroom 
dresser drawer. Id. 
In reviewing the facts, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for 
possessing a firearm: 
Section 76-10-503(1) of the Code prohibits any 
person who has been convicted of a crime of violence 
from owning or having a dangerous weapon "in his 
possession or under his control." Banks unquestionably 
was a restricted person to whom the Statute's 
prohibitions applied. The only question, then, is 
whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that 
Banks possessed or controlled the .22 caliber Ruger 
found in bedroom at his residence. 
Id. 
Banks contended that although the weapon was found under a 
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pillow in a bedroom, there was no evidence to indicate that the 
bedroom was occupied by Banks rather than his wife or the third 
party who also resided in the apartment. Further, there was no 
evidence that Banks owned a gun. The State argued that the 
presence of the gun in Bank's residence should be enough to 
impute its possession and control to him, even if he shared the 
residence and therefore the possession of the gun with his wife 
and third party. In response, the Court stated: 
If the evidence showed that Banks "exercised dominion 
and control" over the weapon, "with knowledge of its 
presence," we would have no difficulty holding that 
Banks could be convicted, even though he may have 
shared control of the weapon with his wife and the 
third party. See State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800, 803 
(Utah 1973); State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872, 874 (Utah 
1964). However, there is absolutely no evidence that 
Banks knew the weapon was in the apartment or that 
he exercised any control over it. There is no logic to 
the State's suggestion that the mere presence of a gun 
in banks' house supports an inference that Banks knew 
the gun was present or that he had some control over 
it. Nor does the record suggest that either the third 
party or Banks1 wife was a restricted person who could 
not lawfully own or possess a gun. There is no 
evidence, for example, that Banks, rather than the 
third party who admittedly lived in the house, slept in 
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or otherwise used the bedroom or bed in which the gun 
was found. It would be wholly arbitrary to conclude 
that the mere presence of the gun in the apartment 
meant that Banks, rather than one of the other two 
people residing there, possessed or controlled it. The 
record here shows a simple failure to prove a critical 
element of the offense; we must therefore find that 
there was insufficient evidence to s u p p o r t t h e 
conviction and reverse. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. 
The State's analysis of the Banks decision is incomplete and 
inaccurate (Appellee's brief at 8). There is no question that 
there was insufficient evidence in Banks to conclude that the 
defendant knew of the presence of the firearms. However, the 
Supreme Court's analysis did not turn exclusively on knowledge of 
the existence of the guns at the residence. The Court held that 
"there is no logic to the State's suggestion that the mere 
presence of a gun . . . supports an inference that Banks knew the 
gun was present or that he had some control over it." Id. 
The Court in Banks held that even though the defendant 
resided in a house where a shotgun was found leaning against a 
dresser in a bedroom, two guns were found under pillows and 
another gun was found in a bedroom dresser drawer, the jury could 
not impute knowledge or control over the firearms to the 
defendant. The Court found that any such attempt to link the 
defendant would be "wholly arbitrary." Id. 
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It is respectfully submitted that as in Banks, the mere non-
exclusively occupancy of the Defendant in a residence where a gun 
is located is not sufficient to justify conviction. The 
Defendant's candid testimony that his father owned the rifle does 
not help the State's case. That acknowledgement neither 
establishes the identity of the person placing the gun in the 
trailer nor establish any control, domination or use of the gun 
by the Defendant. As in Banks the Record shows a complete 
failure to prove one of the two critical elements of the offense. 
The Defendant submits that the evidence is in fact so 
inconclusive that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt. The Utah Appellate Courts have required 
evidence demonstrating control or use and the State's case simply 
failed to provide any such evidence. 
E. The Findings of the Trial Court are Insufficient to 
Support Conviction. 
The Appellant argued in its original brief that the trial 
court's finding was insufficient as a matter of law, to support 
the conviction (Appellant's brief at 20). The Appellee has 
totally failed to respond to the argument (Appellee's brief at 6-
9). 
The court's finding in this case was only that the 
Defendant, "while he did not own the firearms, knowingly had 
possession of the weapons" (R. 88). As established in State v. 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1990), the trial court findings 
must disclose "the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." Id. As outlined by the decisions on 
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the subject there is no evidence or factual findings by the court 
linking the presence of the rifle in the camp trailer to the 
required elements of the crime charged. It is impossible to tell 
what evidence the trial court used to equate to possession of the 
weapons. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DETERMINING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS A "RESTRICTED PERSON." 
A. Definition of the Crime. 
The Defendant was charged with violating Utah Code Annotated 
76-10-503(1) (1994 as Amended), which prohibits a restricted 
person from possessing a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Annotated 
76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as Amended) defines a restricted person as 
a "person who has been convicted of any crime of violence . . . " 
Utah Code Annotated 76-10-501(2)(a) defines "crime of 
violence" as: 
. . . aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, 
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, 
housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied 
by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault. . . arson. . . or an attempt to 
commit any of these offenses. (Emphasis added.) 
B. Test on Appeal. 
The trial court's interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law. State v. Shipler, 869 P. 2d 968 (Utah App. 
1994); Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
The Utah Court of Appeals "reviews questions of law under a 
correction of error standard, without deference to the trial 
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court." State v. Bagshaw, 836 P. 2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Shipler, supra. 
C. Evidence in This Case. 
The evidence relating to the Defendant's conviction of a 
prior criminal act encompassed the offering of State's Exhibit 
No. 1, a Minute Entry from Case No. CR-86-144, filed in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah, 
dated May 2, 1986. The Minute Entry is entitled "Judgment" and 
states in pertinent part as follows: 
The defendant [Kevin Gurr] previously entered a 
plea of Guilty to a charge of Burglary, a Third 
Degree Felony, at which time the matter was referred 
to Adult Probation and Parole. . .Mr. Petro, 
[Defendant's attorney] had a motion to sentence 
defendant under the next lower offense. . . The 
Court granted the defense motion and defendant to 
be sentenced under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the 
circumstances surrounding the charge. . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
State's Exhibit No 1, Addendum No. 2 to Appellant's original 
brief. 
D. The Law Applied to the Facts of the Case. 
The State argues that the reduction of the Defendant's 
conviction to a Class A Misdemeanor "has no affect on its 
substance: a burglary remains a burglary, but becomes a 
different degree of burglary . . . under the statutes plain 
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language, Defendant's conviction for burglary constitutes a crime 
of violence." (Appellee's brief at 10-11). 
The version of Utah Code Annotated 76-3-402 (under which 
Judge Christensen reduced the conviction) in effect at the time 
the Defendant entered his plea permitted a trial court to "enter 
a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense . 
. . . The version of the section now in effect allows the court 
to "enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense. The State argues that there is some difference between 
the sections. As outlined hereinafter, there is no substantive 
difference and clearly the section in effect at the time the 
Defendant was alleged to have committed the crime is the relevant 
statute. Additionally, inasmuch as the statute is clearly 
procedural in nature, the section would be retroactive. Pilcher 
v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983); Roark v. Crabtree, 262 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995). 
There is no meaningful distinction between "categories" and 
"degrees." Felonies are "categorized" into four categories: 
Capital, First Degree, Second Degree and Third Degree. 
Misdemeanors are categorized into Class A, Class B and Class C. 
The change in the statute does not broaden the power of the court 
or change the substantive effect of U.C.A. 76-3-402. In fact, 
the change in the section really has no effect on this case. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-3-402(2)(a) (1991 as Amended), 
controls this case: 
If a conviction is for a Third Degree Felony the 
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conviction is considered to be for a Class A 
Misdemeanor if: 
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be 
for a Class A Misdemeanor and the sentence 
imposed is within the limits provided by 
law for a Class A Misdemeanor . . . . 
There is no question that Mr. Gurr entered a plea to a Third 
Degree Felony charge of Burglary which was reduced, pursuant to 
U.C.A. 76-3-402 to a Class A Misdemeanor. 
The remaining issue is the effect of the reduction to a 
Class A Misdemeanor on the Defendant's alleged status as a 
restricted person. 
U.C.A. 76-10-501(2)(a) (1994 as Amended) explicitly defines 
"crime of violence." Everyone of the listed crimes are felonies. 
The definitional statute makes it clear that only those offenses 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year are the 
offenses which are considered crimes of violence. _Id. See also 
U.C.A. 76-3-204 and 76-3-203 (1983 as Amended). 
When the trial court reduced Mr. Gurr's charge to a Class A 
Misdemeanor and imposed sentence accordingly, Judge Christensen 
fulfilled the mandate established by U.C.A. 76-3-402 that he 
reduced conviction and sentence are to deemed for the lesser 
charge. No one can argue that Mr. Gurr was convicted of a felony 
after Judge Christensen reduced the conviction to a Class A 
Misdemeanor. There is no statute or case law that limits the 
purposes for which the reduction to the next lower category can 
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be used. 
In reviewing a statute, it is the duty of this Court assume 
that each term of a statute was used advisedly and that each 
should be given interpretation and application in accord with 
their usually accepted meaning. Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485 
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971); Board of Education of Granite School Dist. 
v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983). A statute should 
not be applied other than in accordance with its literal wording 
unless it is so unclear or inoperable. Gord v. Salt Lake City, 
434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967); Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline 
Const., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988); Gleave v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R. Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988). 
The statute does not limit the purpose for which the charge 
is lowered and does not distinguish the uses to which a 402 
reduction can be put. The statute is clear that it is not only 
the sentence that will be influenced but that the actual judgment 
of conviction is lowered to the "next category" of offense. 
It is only logical that if that reduction affords a person 
any benefit as it relates to rights and privileges, there is 
nothing in the statute that restricts it's use. In other words, 
if a Third Degree Felony is reduced to a Class A Misdemeanor by 
means of a 402 motion, the person would no longer have the 
limitations of a felony as it affects voting, bonding or the 
like. Similarly, if a 402 motion eliminates a person from a 
category of restricted persons, the defendant should have the 
benefit of the reduction. 
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The State argues that the reduction does not affect the fact 
that the Defendant pleaded guilt to all of the elements of 
burglary (Appellee's brief at 11). The problem with the State's 
argument is that every crime which is included in the definition 
of "crime of violence" is a felony. There are no misdemeanors 
that can be used to substantiate a charge that a person has been 
convicted of a crime of violence. The issue is simple. Was the 
Defendant convicted of a Third Degree Felony or Class A 
Misdemeanor. As set out above, both U.C.A. 76-3-402 and Judge 
Christensen's explicit Ruling clearly establish that the 
Defendant was convicted of a Class A Misdemeanor. Having been 
convicted of a Class A Misdemeanor, the conviction is 
automatically excluded from the crimes defined as "crimes of 
violence." 
This Court should also note that burglary is statutorily 
defined as a Second Degree or Third Degree Felony (U.C.A. 76-6-
202). 
Even if this Court concludes that the Defendant was 
convicted of a Class A Misdemeanor alleging the elements of 
burglary, the Court can not find that the Defendant was a 
restricted person. The definition of "crimes of violence" 
refers to burglary. Burglary is defined as a Second or Third 
Degree crime. When the charge was reduced to a Class A 
Misdemeanor, it could no longer be a burglary as defined by 
statute. 
The State argues: 
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Defendant confuses "category" with "lesser included 
offense." Section 76-3-402 allows the trial court 
to lower the former, it does not permit a trial 
court to enter judgment on a lesser included offense 
from that for which the defendant was convicted or to 
which the defendant pleaded. 
Appellee's brief at 12. 
The argument of the State makes no sense. U.C.A. 76-3-402 
allows a trial court to enter a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower category of offense. As explicitly set out above, 
there is no meaningful difference between "category" and 
"degree." Judge Christensen reduced the conviction to a Class A 
Misdemeanor and the fact is there is no misdemeanor burglary. 
Because a reduction of sentence under 76-3-402 is not 
restricted as to use and because crimes of violence are by 
definition, felonies, a conviction of a Class A Misdemeanor can 
not be a crime of violence. A Ruling by this Court that a 
reduced conviction could be used to enforce prohibitions against 
felons would be confusing and lead to distortion of the statutes 
and case law governing 402 reductions. 
Lastly, the result urged by the State is inequitable. The 
Defendant believed that he had been convicted of a Class A 
Misdemeanor and had the right to vote, be bonded and enjoy the 
other freedoms of the citizenry. There is nothing that would 
have alerted the Defendant to a risk of prosecution based upon a 
felony conviction. 
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It is respectfully submitted that this Court should hold 
that a 402 reduction is in fact to be used for all purposes under 
the law in interpreting the conviction of a Defendant and that 
"crimes of violence" by definition, are felonies. Accordingly, 
the Defendant was not a restricted person and was not prohibited 
in possessing firearms. 
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING MARIJUANA WITH THE INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE. 
The evidence regarding the Defendant's conviction of 
possession with the intent to distribute was clearly set out in 
Appellant's brief in the Procedural History of the Case 
(Appellant's brief at 6-7); the Statement of Facts (Appellant's 
brief at 8-12); and in the Argument (Appellant's brief at 25-27). 
The Appellant has clearly met his burden in marshalling the 
evidence. State v. Strain/ supra. The assertion of the State to 
the contrary is erroneous (Appellee's brief at 14-15). 
The trial court's Findings with regard to the possession 
charge recite: 
4. No one else resided in the trailer at the time of 
the execution of the search warrant. 
5. Personal property including possessions and 
clothing of the Defendant were located in the 
trailer . . . 
7. Officers located 8 separate baggys containing 1/8 
ounce and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the 
trailer in the general vicinity of the built-in table 
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on the end of the trailer. 
8. Officers alow located a set of "finger scales", 
capable of measuring small amounts or quantities. 
9. Near the table officers located a number of 
larger sized bags containing marijuana residue. 
Officers testified that the bags were of the type 
typically used to package larger amounts of marijuana 
which would then be broken for sale into smaller 
quantities such as baggies of marijuana . . . 
12. A Motorola mobile phone was found within 
the trailer. 
13. In response to questions from the officers, the 
Defendant stated that the marijuana had been "fronted" 
or provided on credit and that people called on the 
phone to inquire about marijuana. 
14. Officers located several pipes used for the 
ingestion of marijuana. 
R. 87-89. 
As outlined above, there was evidence of marijuana leaves in 
the trailer, finger scales, plastic sandwich bags (which were 
consistent with the making of sandwiches by the persons using the 
trailer); five one gallon plastic bags. The total marijuana found 
was 27.5 grams (T. 147-48). The large one gallon plastic bags 
and the smaller sandwich bags were not tested and did not contain 
residue of marijuana. The testimony of the officers of the 
amount of marijuana that could be contained in the plastic bags 
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is irrelevant in that no marijuana or residue were found in 
them. 
The issue in this case is whether the findings of the 
relatively small amount of marijuana can be used to support a 
finding of "intent to distribute." The Defendant contends that 
the existence of paraphernalia including the finger scales and 
plastic bags is not sufficient to support intent to distribute. 
The State does not argue with the analogy to Utah Code 
Annotated 58-37-8(2)(b)(i-iii) (1953 as Amended) as demonstrating 
the amount of marijuana in this case is not sufficient to 
indicate an intent to distribute the same. The statute 
categorizes possession of 100 pounds of marijuana or more as a 
Second Degree Felony. Possession of 16 ounces to 100 pounds is a 
Third Degree Felony. Possession of less than 16 ounces is a 
Class A Misdemeanor. In this case, the Defendant had less than 
16 ounces consistent with a Class A Misdemeanor, yet the 
Defendant was charged and convicted of a felony. 
In the Appellant's original brief, reference is made to a 
large number of cases that have required a finding of substantial 
quantities of drugs to warrant a finding of an intent to 
distribute (Appellant's brief at 28, 29). 
The State in response has referred the Court to three cases. 
The first is State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987). The 
defendants in that case were found with 78 grams of marijuana. 
The testimony at trial was the approximate 3 ounces was more 
than the defendants would hold for personal use. Id. The amount 
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of marijuana found in Constantino was nearly 3 times the amount 
found in this case. 
The next case cited by the State is State v. Hansen, 710 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1985). In that case, 13.5 grams of cocaine were 
found. The court explicitly held that the finding of 
paraphernalia coupled with the "relatively large quantity of 
cocaine . . . provided the jury with an adequate basis to find an 
intent to distribute for value." Id. The last case cited is 
State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In that case 
the officers found "large quantities of marijuana in the 
garbage." The officers found drug scales, sophisticated 
distilling equipment and 8 grocery bags filled with 15 pounds of 
dried marijuana. Id. 
There is no question that the Defendant had a small amount 
of marijuana that could be attributed to him. The officers did 
find plastic bags and finger scales. However, under the case law 
set out in the Appellant's original brief and the case law relied 
upon by the State, the existence of paraphernalia such as 
scales, bags and the like, without a finding of large quantities 
of drugs is insufficient to support a finding of intent to 
distribute. The amount found in this case was consistent for 
personal use and clearly insufficient under the cases to 
constitute sufficient quantity to support an intent to 
distribute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant does not appeal or dispute the finding of the 
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trial court as it relates to the possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
As it relates to possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, the case law and evidence establish that the Defendant 
had been convicted of a Class A Misdemeanor. The Class A 
Misdemeanor could not be construed as a "crime of violence" which 
would then make the Defendant a restricted person. Secondly, the 
court's findings with regard to control of the rifle were 
insufficient. The evidence establishes that the Defendant neither 
owned nor controlled the rifle in question. 
Finally, the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction of "intent to distribute." The evidence simply 
supports possession and the finding of the trial court in that 
regard should be reversed. 
Dated this X day of May, 1995. 
Michael J. Petro, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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